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THE CONSTITUTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF DELEGATED
LEGISLATION IN ENGLAND

J. A. G. Griffith*

T

Introduction

HE Committee on Ministers' Powers defined delegated legisla-

tion as the "exercise by a subordinate authority, such as a Minister,
of the legislative power delegated to him by Parliament."1 This
definition followed logically from the terms of reference which required the Committee to report "what safeguards are desirable or
necessary to secure the constitutional principles of the sovereignty of
Parliament and the supremacy of the Law."'2 Behind these two
statements lie certain assumptions which coloured the Report of the
Committee and influenced its recommendations. One of these assumptions is that Ministers of the Crown are "subordinate" to Parliament
so that any great increase in their powers may threaten Parliamentary
sovereignty. A second assumption is that the phrase "legislative power"
of Parliament is self-explanatory and free from ambiguity. These two
assumptions are closely connected for they appear to answer implicitly
the questions of the relationship of the Executive to Parliament and
of the functions which the latter body performs under the Constitution
today.
The contention advanced in the following pages is that Parliament
and the Executive must be regarded as two interrelated organs of the
Constitution, charged with differing functions, neither having any
inherent supremacy over the other. The terms of this interrelation
are governed, first, by ministerial responsibility and, second, by the
fact that the Executive commands a majority in the House of Commons. The functions of Parliament necessarily result from its nature
and the limits of these functions follow from its composition. The
increase in the scope of Executive action has emphasised and clarified
the demarcation of these limits.
In the attempt to avoid assumption, delegated legislation is defined
as the exercise by a Minister of the Crown (or other authority) of a
power, conferred by statute, to make, confirm or approve rules, regu* Lecturer in Administrative Law in the University of London.-Ed.
'Report of the Committee on Ministers' Powers 15, Cmd. 4060.
2 Id. at 1.
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lations, orders or schemes which, normally, are valid without further
Parliamentary consideration.
Any account written at this time of political institutions must first
draw attention to the change in the purpose of government and to
the vast increase in the number of governmental functions during the
century. "We nod approvingly today," says Sir Cecil Carr, "when
someone tells us that, whereas the State used to be merely policeman,
judge and protector, it now has become schoolmaster, doctor, housebuilder, road-maker, town-planner, public utility supplier and all the
rest of it."'3 The process is often accelerated by wars and, since 1939,
six new Ministries with extensive powers have been created: Fuel and
Power, Supply, Food, National Insurance, Civil Aviation, and Town
and Country Planning. Increase in functions implies increase in
power, and governments in this country obtain fresh power by means
of legislation. While the actual number of statutes enacted in a session
has not greatly changed in the last forty years, Acts of Parliament have
become longer and more complex. In the 1906-13 period, the average
number of statutes in each session was fifty; in the 1929/30-1937/38
period, it rose to fifty-seven. But the number of pages for each session
for the same periods increased from 335 to 995 and the average length
of a statute from 7 to 17 pages; at the same time devices such as legislation by reference and the elimination of much of the prolixity of
the statutes of earlier periods have resulted in more actual legislative
matter being contained on each page of the annual volumes of the
Statute Book.4 Nor is there any probability of a decrease in legislative
output in the future; on the contrary, the indications are that the rate
will continue to rise. In this critical period of social and economic
history, political parties are returned to power to put into effect policies
having far-reaching effects. A party-of one political colour which succeeds in displacing the Government of the day will, even though it
may wish ultimately to limit the number of bills presented to Parliament, be forced to some extent to substitute its own measures first.
This is, of course, particularly true today when the legislative intentions
of the principal political parties differ more fundamentally than at any
previous time in Parliamentary history. Changes in social and economic
policy cannot be effected without the power given by Acts of Parliament, and the whole process of legislation-the preparing of the bill,
the consultation with affected interests, the conferences, the drafting,
3 CARR, CONCERNING ENGLISH ADMINISTRAT V E LAW 10

(1941).

4 H.C. 189-1 (1946) 15719(7) and appendix, TmRD REPORT AND MINUTES OF EviDENCE O

SELECT COMMITTEE ON PROCEDURE.
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the presentation to Parliament and the management of the debatesall are governmental functions. During the periods when the Executive was relatively inactive, the prestige and status of Parliament was
high, its power and influence paramount, but there is an "inherent
tendency, in our system, for government, as such, to reassert itself
whenever the opportunity or the need might arise."' The demand for
social and economic reforms which has characterised this *century has
given power to the Executive with a resultant loss to the initiating
functions of Parliament. The vast majority of legislative proposals
now originate in the Departments. In the 1936-7 session, 70 General
and Public Acts were passed. Of these, 55 were introduced by Departments, 11 by Private Members, 2 by the Lord Advocate and 1 each by
the Prime Minister and the Attorney General. Of the 11 introduced
by Private Members, 3 were backed by Departments and 2 followed
Reports of Departmental Committees; local authority associations
backed 2; of the remaining 4, 2 were supported by the R.S.P.C.A.
and similar bodies, 1 by the Salvation Army and Church Army and the
last was Sir Alan Herbert's Matrimonial Clauses Act which was introduced by another Private Member.' Moreover, the Government has
never hesitated to encroach on Private Members' time when it considered this necessary; in 3 of the sessions of the inter-war period, the
whole of the time was taken while in abbut half of the other sessions,
it was more or less seriously curtailed. It has been only partially
restored since the end of the war. During the period 1906-1937/8,
excluding the war years, Private Members' bills averaged 11.4 days
or nearly 9 per cent of the session. Finally, the development of party
discipline has consolidated the power of the Executive over Parliament
during its period of office.
The flexibility and resilience of the British form of government
and the freedom to develop enjoyed in the absence of a written constitution have often been remarked, but the ability to stand on one's
head without losing one's feet demands both practice and a nice sense
of balance. While the functions of government were mainly regulatory
or negative, Parliament was able to dispense its business without undue
hurry; the session of 1860 which lasted from January to August was
considered very long.8 Now, of course, the session begins in the
autumn and the summer adjournment is rarely longer than three
5

AMEny, THoUGrs ON THE CONSTITUTION 14-15 (1947). I take this opportunity
of acknowledging my debt to this brilliant analysis which is often referred to liereafter.
6 JENNrNGS, PAP.LrimENT, appx. 11 (1940).
7 H.C. 189-1 (1946) Campion, Appendix to Report 15.
8 JENNINGS, PArLIAMENT 87

(1940).
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months. Parliamentary procedure has been continuously modified during the last century, and expedients, which increased the power of the
Executive, have been introduced to enable Parliament to deal with
its vastly increased labours. As the Lord Chancellor said in 1945,
".... if the State, instead of being content merely to act as referee
and to blow the whistle when the player gets offside, wishes to come
down into the arena and take part in the game, the State must see to it
that it is sufficiently nimble-footed to take its part in the game with the
other players. For that reason we have to see whether our procedure
is sufficiently up to date."' But longer sessions and improved procedure
by themselves were not enough and governments, finding they could
not complete the work demanded of them if every detail of their legislative proposals were submitted to full Parliamentary scrutiny, began
to insert in bills provisions which granted to government departments
power to legislate on certain matters. While examples of the delegation
of legislative power may be found from the fourteenth century onwards, the modem practice is usually said to date from the Poor Law
Act of 1834"0 which was in fact the first attempt to regulate the lives
of a large class of persons-the legal poor.
The argument against delegated legislation may be expressed in
two ways. First, if laws are made affecting the subject, they must be
submitted for consideration and approval to the representative body
and, second, if the Executive has power to make laws, the supremacy
or sovereignty of Parliament is seriously impaired, so that dangerous
disproportions of power are created which threaten to alter the balance
of the constitution." The answer to the first statement is that the
institution of Parliament acquired its present form and procedure during centuries when there was comparatively little legislative output
and, if a government is returned to power to put into effect a policy
involving many social and economic reforms, a large amount of legislation is inevitable. If, then, the existing institutions are found to
impede the execution of the policy approved by the electorate, they
must be amended. Before an answer can be attempted to the second
statement, the nature of the relationship between Parliament' and the
Executive must be examined.
9 137 H.L. DEB. 5s, col. 1150. (Nov. 22, 1945).
10 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76 (1834).
ORDB s 14-18 (1945).
:1 Cf. ALLE;N, LAW A
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The Position of Parliament
A. Parliamentary Supremacy.
The phrases "Parliamentary sovereignty" and "Parliamentary supremacy' are not used distinctively. The Committee on Ministers'
Powers (referred to hereafter as the Donoughmore Committee) was
set up in 1929 to consider the powers exercised by the Ministers of
the Crown and "to report what safeguards are desirable or necessary
to secure the constitutional principles of the' sovereignty of Parliament
and the supremacy of the law."12 In 1943 it was moved in the House
of Commons "That this House, admitting the necessity for war purposes of giving abnormal powers to the Executive, is of the opinion
that Parliament should vigilantly maintain its ancient right and duty
of examining legislation, whether delegated or otherwise," and a Member asserted that this motion "affects the functions of the House itself.
Our object is to suggest certain safeguards which we believe to be
necessary to secure the constitutional principle of the sovereignty of
Parliament.... it is no exaggeration to say that the sovereignty of
Parliament is threatened."' 3 In these two cases the phrase is being
used to mean something more than the need for the approval of Parliament to a legislative proposal. For otherwise, the Donoughmore Committee could at once have reported to the Lord Chancellor that the
sovereignty of Parliament was in no way affected since all power
to legislate had been expressly given by Parliament whose legal
sovereignty in this sense remained clearly unimpaired. Similarly, if
the Member in 1943 meant by "the sovereignty of Parliament" the
right of Parliament to insist that no decree having the force of law
could be made without its consent, the motion has no value. In fact,
as it stands, on any meaning, it is confused. For "the ancient right
and duty of examining legislation" means the right of considering
bills or legislative proposals. There is no "ancient right and duty" of
examining delegated legislation, if by that is meant the statutory rules
and orders themselves, any more than there is of habitually examining
enactments on the Statute Book; if by "delegated legislation" is meant
the delegation of the power to legislate, the ancient right and duty
is preserved by the debate on the empowering bill. The laying of
2
1

13

Report of the Committee on Ministers' Powers 1, Cmd. 4060.
389 H.C. DEB. 5s, cols. 1601-2 (May 26, 1943).
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the regulations before Parliament in accordance with the parent act
merely confirms that the regulations have been made under the authority of Parliament. "Sovereignty" and "legal sovereignty" have in fact
two meanings in connection with Parliament. The first meaning is
that Parliament can enact what it pleases dind that only Parliament,
or other bodies by its authority, can legislate. The second meaning,
and here the word "supremacy" is perhaps better used, is that Parliament possesses ultimate power over the Executive. In the seventeenth
century, Parliament wrested from the King much of his power to
legislate without its consent. Many writers today, alarmed at the
growth of governmental "interference" purport to find a similarity
between the situation in 1688 and that of today; they argue that in
effect the Executive is regaining the power of the King to legislate by
decree. The superficial similarity no doubt exists but to regard the
two as parallel or identical is to ignore the whole development of the
constitution during the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries
and to disregard completely the theory and practice of ministerial
responsibility and representative government. The powers of Parliament in fields other than the legislative are very great and by defeating
the Government on an important issue in the House of Commons,
Parliament can force an appeal to the electorate. But the powers of
the Government existed in the executive sphere before Parliament
began its long struggle; the rights of Parliament today have been won
by Parliament; those powers which have not been wrested remain
with the Crown, although today, of course, the Crown acts through
Ministers who must account for their actions to Parliament. "I do
not think," Lord Eustace Percy has said, "it would be correct constitutional doctrine that Parliament is supreme over the Executive. That
would mean that Parliament is supreme over the Crown which it
certainly is not.... I am quite clear that historically the powers exer-

cised by the executive Government are not derived from the House
of Commons necessarily."' 4 The increase in the functions of government has emphasised the fact that the "supremacy of Parliament' does
not mean that Parliament has a monopoly of power.
B. The Separation of Powers
Consideration of the relationship between Parliament and the
Executive has unfortunately been confused by discussion on the
14 H.C. 161 (1931)

2041, 2047, MNUTrrEs oF EVIDENCE oF SELECT ComMITrEE

ON PROCEDURE ON PuRuc BusNEss.
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doctrine of the separation of powers. The doctrine which was conceived in error and had several unfortunate and bastard offspring has
been killed and buried on numerous occasions. In 1872 Bagehot
wrote: "The efficient secret of the English constitution may be
described as the close union, the nearly complete fusion, of the executive and legislative powers. No doubt by the traditional theory, as it
exists in all the books, the goodness of our constitution consists in the
entire separation of the legislative and executive authorities, but in
truth its merit consists in their singular approximation. The connecting
' In 1920 A. F. Pollard devoted a complete chapter
link is the cabinet."'to the demolition of the theory."0 In 1930 Dr. Robson described it
as "a legendary conception which has at no period of English history
accurately described the actual division of authority between the various
organs of government."'" In 1945 Dr. C. K. Allen resurrected and
re-interpreted the doctrine.'" Perhaps one reason why it still haunts
the pages of constitutional law is its merit of being clear cut; against
the background of its simplicity the structure of the institutions of
the constitution and their complex interrelation can be studied; but
the result of choosing a simple yet false analysis as a starting point
is that the conclusions are not always wholly free from the misconceptions of the doctrine. Thus it has been referred to as "a very incomplete
and to some extent a misleading account"' 9 of the mechanism of the
English constitution, instead of being exposed as inconsistent with the
facts. Another reason may be that certain of the undoubted working advantages of the English form of government, such as the independence of
the judiciary and the traditional impartiality of the Civil Service, derive
from the isolation of one group of individuals from other groups. Or
thirdly, the doctrine may draw its vitality from the use of the words Legislature, Executive and Judiciary. Whatever the reason, the doctrine still
lives despite the fact that the essence of the English constitution lies not
in the separation of powers but in the responsibility of an Administration
elected for a limited number of years and dismissable within that
period. The Cabinet is not best described as a "connecting link"
between two bodies. It is, more accurately, the centre from which
radiate both Government Departments and Parliament. But indeed
any such metaphors are too simple to describe even pictorially the
15

BAOEHOT, Tim ENGLISH CONSTrrTTION, rev. ed., 78-9 (1908).
16 PoLLAr D, TnE EvoLtrrloN oF PNwjAmnr, c. XII (1920).

17Donoughmore Committee Minutes of Evidence 51.
18 ALIN , LAw AN ORDERs, c. 1 (1945).
19 Report of Donoughmore Committee 8, Cmd. 4060.
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relationship between the parts of the constitution. Cabinet Ministers
are in fact the heads of the important Departments and at the same time
lead their political party both inside and outside the Houses of Parliament. In practice the legislative and executive functions are largely
exercised by the same group of individuals, who could, if supported
by their majority in Parliament, reduce that body to a voting machine
and acquire despotic power by constitutional means. The nature of
any institution is determined by the character of the individuals who
compose it and while Parliament continues to attract men of high
attainments, there is no danger that Ministers will be able to evade
their responsibilities.
C. Three Views of the Relationship
There are broadly three views of the nature of the relationship
between Parliament and the Executive. The first is that of nineteenth
century Liberalism as explained by Bagehot; the second is the Liberal
view of the present day; and the third may be called realist. The first
two are philosophical in approach and suffer from a confusion between
the actual and the desired; the third is analytical and does not pronounce on the merits or otherwise of the nature of the relationship.
There are many other opinions of what should be the nature of the
relationship; we are concerned only with those views which purport
to be descriptive.
One reason why Bagehot's attack only scotched the theory of the
separation of powers was that he misunderstood the relative positions
of Cabinet and Parliament in the constitution. Had he stopped in
his explanation with the quotation given above,2 ° much subsequent
confusion might have been avoided; but he continued, and described
the Cabinet as "a committee of the legislative body selected to be the
executive body.... The Cabinet, in a word, is a board of control,
chosen by the legislature, out of persons whom it trusts and knows,
to rule the nation."2 This idea that political power is delegated from
the electorate through Parliament to the Executive is typical of much
nineteenth century Liberal thought. It would lead, as Mr. L. S. Amery
has observed, to multiplicity of parties and weak unstable governments
unless the government is elected for a particular period and is not
dismissable within that period.22 It is one thing to say that the Cabinet
20 Supra, note 15.
21

BAGoHOr, Tnn ExG

s

22 AMrny, Taouars oN

CoxswrroN, rev. ed., 79, 81 (1908).
CoNsirroN 19-20 (1947).
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must have the confidence of Parliament and quite another to assert
that Parliament in any way appoints the Cabinet. Yet in a weakened
form, the belief persists. In 1946 a member of a House of Commons
Select Committee referred to "the indirect control which Parliament
has as to who shall be Ministers and who shall not" and Sir Gilbert
Campion agreed that the appointment of Ministers in this sense was
a function of the House.23 Constitutional practice and convention
clearly show that the Cabinet is not a committee of Parliament. In the
first place the King chooses his Prime Minister and although, generally,
there can be no doubt who is the appropriate individual as leader
of the majority party, the choice was real both in 1894 when Lord
Rosebery was preferred to Sir William Harcourt and Lord Spencer,
and again in 1923 when Mr. Baldwin and not Lord Curzon was appointed. 4 In the light of the evidence at present available, it seems
that the King's choice of Ramsay MacDonald in 1931 was real rather
than formal.25 More importantly, the power of the Prime Minister
to choose his cabinet is exercised without reference to Parliament
although the Prime Minister will consider whether his Ministers will
be generally acceptable to the members of his majority in the House
of Commons, and will normally choose from those Members who
have long service in the House. There are many examples of appointments surprising not only to the country but to the party in power;
Mr. Baldwin's choice of Mr. Winston Churchill as Chancellor of the
Exchequer in 1923 is a well-known case; that of Sir Thomas Inskip
as Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence in 1936 is another.
Equally it is often difficult, though by no means impossible, for a
Prime Minister to pass over one of his leading colleagues in the party.
It is known that Ramsay MacDonald did not want Arthur Henderson
as Foreign Secretary in 1929 but was obliged to yield as otherwise
Henderson would have remained outside the Government. The great
amount of discussion both among members of Parliament and the
general public, the hopes and fears, the false prophesying and the
wild guesses that precede a government re-shuffle clearly show how little
Members of Parliament know of the Prime Minister's intentions and
how completely the final choosing rests in his hands. Professor Laski
follows Bagehot fairly closely here when he writes: "The business of
making a Government and providing it, or refusing to provide it,
with the formal authority for carrying on the public business is the
23
24
25

H.C. 189-1 (1946)

1829.

AmxRy, THoUGHTS oN THE CoNsmTiozN 21-2 (1947).
LAsKi, PAIILImiENTARY GovEP mNT IN ENGLAND 233-6

(1938).
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pivotal function of the House of Commons.... The Government,
indeed, is nothing so much as a committee of the House created to
put before it measures for its acceptance."26 Later, however, he writes:
"The Cabinet is essentially a committee of that party or coalition of
parties which can command a majority in the House of Commons. "27
This, if more accurate, is a very different proposition. He stresses,
also, the selective function of the House "by which is meant that subtle
psychological process by which one member makes a reputation and
another fails to make one, with its consequential repercussions on the
personnel of Governments."28 No doubt it is true that success on the
floor of the House indicates that a Member possesses one of the attributes valuable in a Cabinet Minister. But administrative ability is
more. valuable and is not always linked with fluency or charm. The
selective function seems to amount to this: if a Member is successful
and popular in the House, he has more chance of gaining office than
another who, though his equal or perhaps slightly his superior in general
ability, is less successful and less popular.
The Liberal view of the present day finds its chief exponent in
Sir Ernest Barker. 9 In his view, democracy means government by
the people; but mere majority rule in its crudest form would be based
ultimately on force and is not therefore acceptable; this difficulty
disappears when we realize that the essence of government in this
country is discussion. In his analysis, the widely divergent opinions
and wills of the people are canalised by their acceptance of one or
another party programme; the electorate then chooses one programme
by choosing representatives, and Parliament translates the general programme of the majority into rules of law and a spirit of administration;
whereupon the Cabinet translates all that has gone before into action.
Discussion takes place at each stage. This is obviously a direct descendant of Bagehot's presentation. The idea is one of delegation.
Thus it is said that at the time of an election, the electorate "takes
over" from the party and "hands on" to Parliament discharging in
this latter operation an instructive function, for it instructs the individuals selected to discuss the translation of the policy into law,
which the Cabinet puts into effect. We are .not here directly concerned whether this picture of groups of reasonable individuals discus26

Id. at 142, 144.

27 Id. at 221.

28 Id. at 144.
29

BagmlR, REPLEcnoNS oN GovEmE T, c. 11 (1942).
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sing, compromising and agreeing to differ truly reflects the passion, the
bias and the cut and thrust of political government. The following
criticisms are, however, relevant. Sir Ernest Barker says, "Parliament
...has a specific function of making general rules of law.... But
Parliament has to remember the general instructions which it has
received from the electorate.3 ° It is in fact surely impossible to regard
Parliament as a unit in such a matter. The distinction between the
supporters of the Government and His Majesty's Opposition is fundamental to the process of legislation. Yet it would seem to follow from
Sir Ernest Barker's argument that if the government of the day fails
to carry out-to the full its electoral promises, it is as much the duty of
the leader of the Opposition as of the government supporters to demand
that the mandate be made effective; in fact, the duty of the Opposition
is to oppose those proposals. If, on the other hand, by "Parliament' in
the last quotation is meant "government supporters," then the argument that government is based on discussion and compromise cannot
be maintained. Parliament is composed of two groups, one larger than
the other. One group thinks that one course is best for the country;
the other group thinks that another course is best. It is no part of the
duty of the larger group to alter its course to accommodate the other; it
may occasionally accept a criticism as valid, but the essence of democratic government is not discussion and compromise but the consent
of the smaller group to be governed by the larger. The method of
parliamentary government is to answer and deal with criticism without
being undermined. Governments stand or fall by their success in dealing with the country's problems not by their ability to compromise with
the Opposition.
On the question at present under discussion-the relationship between Parliament and the Government-Sir Ernest Barker is not precise. He says, "When a parliament has constituted a cabinet (one can
hardly apply the word 'selection' to the informal and mainly indirect
methods by which cabinets come into existence), the cabinet sits in
parliament, and a large part of its activity will be its activity in parliament. It will be instructed or guided by parliament: it will equally, or
even more, give instruction or guidance to parliament." 31 The confusion becomes worse when Sir Ernest denies that the cabinet is the
nominee and delegate of Parliamentae 2 but asserts that Parliament "cre30 Id.
at 58.
31 Id. at 49. Italics added.
32 Id. at 50. Italics added.
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ates... a cabinet which is then equally its own master and competent
for its own function within the range of the general instructions involved in the act of appointment. 33 According to this, Parliament

"constitutes" or "creates" the Cabinet in a manner not specified and
the Cabinet is then independent so far as executive action is concerned;
but Parliament also "appoints" and "instructs" and this limits the sphere
of executive action; yet the Cabinet is not the "delegate" or "nominee"
of Parliament. This presentation of the Cabinet "constituted" by Parliament and given general instructions to put into effect completely ignores
the enormous influence of the members of the Cabinet over Parliament. And when Sir Ernest Barker, conscious of this omission, adds
that the Cabinet instructs and guides Parliament even more than
Parliament instructs and guides the Cabinet, the inconsistency is admitted. The confusion seems to result from a desire to give Parliament
a status and a power in the government of the country far greater than
it possesses in fact. The attempt to show that democracy means government by the people, based not on the ultimate force of the majority,
but on discussion, must always fail on this crucial issue of the relationship between Parliament and the Cabinet. The House of Commons
may be regarded in theory as the people in committee but since the
Cabinet is the governing body, the people can only be said to govern
if, in Sir Ernest's words, Parliament "appoints" and "instructs" the
Cabinet; to say that the Cabinet is nevertheless not the "nominee" or
"delegate" of Parliament seems to be playing with words. As already
noted, Parliament does not in fact appoint, create or constitute the
Cabinet. In the administration of the country, Parliament does not
instruct, however much it may criticize and warn. It might be argued
that Parliaments assent to a legislative proposal by the Government is
an instruction to the Cabinet to put the proposal into effect but the use
of the word is unreal. If the members of the Cabinet had no authority
over Parliament which, as an independent unit, rejected or assented
to the proposal solely on its merits then the assent might be regarded
as a modified form of instruction. But when the members of the Cabinet are also the most influential Members of Parliament and leaders of
the political party commanding a majority in the House of Commons
and when the rejection of a legislative proposal in that House entails
the resignation of the Cabinet, then the formal assent can scarcely be
called a positive instruction from one constitutional body to another.
33

Id. at 51. Italics added.
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The third view begins by denying that Parliament in any real sense
appoints or instructs the executive through the Cabinet and rejects as
fictitious the idea of government by the people through delegation.
"Our system," writes Mr. L. S. Amery, "is one .. . of democracy by
consent and not by delegation, of government of the people, for the
people, with, but not by, the people. 3 4 The elector, when voting,
consciously performs two functions: first, he votes for a party, for a policy and for government by a certain group the leaders of which he
knows by name and repute; second, he votes for an individual to be his
representative in Parliament. Choosing, in this way, the group to govern, the electorate may be said to appoint the leader of that group to be
Prime Minister and in a more general and imprecise way to appoint
the Cabinet. At the same time, it must be repeated that in a doubtful
case, the King's choice of Prime Minister is real and that the size, shape
and internal structure of the Cabinet are determined by the Prime
Minister himself. But it remains accurate to say that the electorate
rather than Parliament appoints the Cabinet. The electorate chooses
one group of leaders rather than another; Parliament does not choose
at all. Once established, the Cabinet puts into effect the policy publicised at the General Election; by using its power and influence in
Parliament, it gains Parliamentary assent to its legislative proposals.
With the Cabinet, not Parliament, lies the initiative in government.
The Cabinet proposes, Parliament considers; the Cabinet acts, Parliament criticizes or approves. To govern efficiently the Cabinet must
command a majority in the House of Commons; with that majority its
power is very great and will fail only if a large proportion of its majority
decide that the electorate must be given an opportunity to decide the
issue on which there is disagreement with the Cabinet. "The House
of Commons," wrote Lord Eustace Percy, "has never succeeded in extending its effective action much beyond the field where it had established itself 200 years ago. . . . It does not and cannot govern -the
country and many of its present defects probably arise from the recent
'democratic' tendency to convert it into a sovereign parliamentary assembly on the continental model, governing the country through a
committee of ministers. . . . The King's Ministers are responsible to
Parliament ... for the discharge of duties which Parliament is radically
unfitted to discharge for itself.... It never has been, and never will be,
able to offer (Ministers) authoritative guidance in the efficient and
34

AmERY, TourHs

oN THE CONSTTTON

20-1 (1947).
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economical management of their departments."35 The electorate decides who shall govern for the ensuing five years or until Parliament is
dissolved, but once ,the government is established neither the people
nor Parliament rules. The Government does not refer to Parliament
before it acts or before it makes legislative proposals. In the sphere of
administrative action, the Government is independent of Parliament.
The people do not govern; they choose who shall govern, and, through
their representatives, exercise their right to criticise and defend the
government.
II
The Function of Parliament
This contention that the primary function of Parliament is to criticise and defend the Government is by no means universally accepted,
the opposition basing their objection on the ground that the right to
deliberate, however valuable and salutary, is finally a negative function.'
In considering the function of the House of Commons (for it is with
that body we are concerned) the danger of confusing what the House
does in fact with what it should do is very real. The word "function"
itself suggests that the act is done with a particular purpose and that
the nature and quality of the act are to be determined by its fitness for
attaining the desired object. The House of Commons performs a definite function in the constitution today; the procedure of the House
should be suited to that function. But the nature of the constitution
changes, the load of power shifts, and the functions of the various
bodies change. As the constitution is perpetually changing, so inevitably the procedure of any part of it is always, despite constant modification and reform, a little out of date. A statement on the nature of the
functions of the-House of Commons or on the need for a specific reform
in its procedure must therefore be considered in relation to the nature
of the constitution at the time.
A. Various Opinions
Bagehot listed five functions: (1) to elect the executive leaders,
(2) to express the mind of the people, (3) to teach the nation what it
does not know, (4) to lay complaints and (5) to legislate.36 A modem
writer has found the function to lie in the second, third and fourth of
3

5H.C. 161 (1931) 171-2.
BAGEHOT, Tim ENGISH

36

CoNsnTtrION,

rev. ed., 168-203 (1908).
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these." There is no doubt, as has been often remarked, that Bagehot
deliberately put legislation last for he denies that this function is as
important as the executive management of the state or the political
education given by Parliament to the whole nation; but it is clear that
he still regarded statute law as exceptional and, very often, particular
and so of comparative unimportance. 8 In 1931, the Parliamentary
Secretary to the Treasury put the function of legislating first when
giving evidence before a Select Committee. Sir Dennis Herbert asked
him: "Generally speaking your theory is to make things easier for what
happens to be the majority at the moment whether it be in the country
or... in the House?"-"That is so."
"And regardless of the fact that that majority may be very slender,
and of the fact that in a very short time that slender majority may be
on the other side?"-"I can see no alternative to majority rule." The
impression given was that, in his own words, the Parliamentary Secretary regarded the House of Commons as "less of a debating society than
a legislative machine" and since he was Chief Government Whip, this
is not surprising." The Speaker of the House was not of the same
opinion: "I say deliberately that rapid passage of masses of legislation
perhaps imperfectly considered and possibly under the false impression
that they are earnestly and intelligently desired by the great bulk of
the people is certainly not either the main or the sole function of Parliament."4 Another witness41 before the same Select Committee put the
legislative function last and the function of administering the country's
finances first. Presumably what this witness had in mind was to discourage large scale government action by imposing a rigid economy; this
is an interesting example of how the functions of the House of Commons may be considered to change. In the first place, the period of
this Select Committee, 1931-2, was one when no large amount of
spending was considered desirable. Secondly, to limit government expenditure had long been one of the principal aims of the House of
Commons but "when social reform became the dominant interest, the
representatives of the people ceased to be a check and began to apply
the spur to expenditure. ' 42 This is reflected in the fact that it is still
necessary to move a reduction in the Estimates even if the objection is
37 JENNINGS, PaanrwAmN
496 (1940).
88BAGEHOT, ThE ENGLISH GONSITruION, rev. ed., 203 (1908).

39 H.C. 161 (1931)

1%891-2.

Id. at 405(2).
Sir Bolton Eyres Monsell, id. at 1282.
42 H.C. 189-1 (1946) Campion, Appendix to Report
40
41

9.
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based on a belief that more money should be spent. It was before this
Committee that Mr. Winston Churchill said there were two alternative
functions the House could perform. It could either be "a highly efficient machine for passing all kinds of Bills into laws" or "a grand forum
of national debate." He preferred it to be the latter.4 Lord Eustace
Percy was of the opinion that the proper business of the House of
Commons was to focus public attention on the important issues of the
day, to grant taxation limited to the immediate needs of the Executive,
to appropriate the public revenues to particular services, to press the
Executive (in return for the taxes granted) for the redress of popular
grievances and to grant the Executive such additional legal powers as
might be necessary for the efficient conduct of public administration."
It will be noted that the main point discussed is whether the House of
Commons should be regarded primarily as a legislative, or primarily as
a critical and deliberative body and it seems to have been realised that
the functions of the House would develop according to which view
prevailed. The great need was for the House to be able to follow more
closely the lines of Executive action and it was with this in mind that
Mr. Lloyd George urged the setting up of committees of Members
attached to particular groups of Departments 3 and that Mr. Churchill
suggested the formation of an Economic Sub-Parliament.4

A different

emphasis has been given by the former Clerk of the House, Sir Gilbert
Campion, in the memoranda he submitted and the evidence he adduced
to the Select Committee on Procedure which was set up in 1945. The
Third Report of that Committee47 deals at length with Sir Gilbert's

proposals for procedural reform but accepts (as do the Government
witnesses) 48 his analysis of the main functions of the House. These
are the representation of public opinion, the control of finance, the
formulation of policy and the control of policy and administration, and

legislation. 4' The Government memorandum inevitably stressed the
legislative function.5"
Broadly, Parliament might attempt to fill one of four roles: to govern, to control those who govern, to examine and comment on the
43H.C. 161 (1931)
4Id.at 171-2.

1520-1.

45 Id.at
356-62.
4
6 Id.at 351 ff.

47 H.O. 189 (1946).

Id. at 113184-6.
49 Id.Appendix to Report
50 Id. at 3180(1).
48

7 and 1826-7.
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proposals and actions of the Government, or to record formal approval
of these proposals and actions. The last represents the final position
any political institution fills before it ceases to exist; we are assuming
that Parliament is a valuable and necessary institution and therefore
can discard this possibility at once. It has already been noted that
Parliament does not govern, but, mainly because of a misunderstanding
of the meaning of democracy, the fallacy persists. Two examples will
suffice: a barrister giving evidence before the Donoughmore Committee
was asked whether he did not think that the reason why the administrative duty of initiating and implementing Town Planning Schemes
was imposed primarily on local authorities subject to the approval of
the Minister, was that Parliament was not a suitable body; he answered,
"I fail to see why the Minister should be a better Tribunal.... I have
in mind that, as a matter of principle, we should be governed by
Parliament and that there should not be this complete delegation to
Government Departments."'" A representative of the National Federation of Property Owners and Ratepayers said before the same Committee, "Property owners (and I venture to think the majority of the
people in this country) desire to be governed by Parliament direct, by
their elected representatives, and do not desire Parliament to surrender
its power to legislate to Government Departments. 52 To this way of
thinking Sir Courtenay Ilbert gave the classic reply: "Parliament does
not govern. Parliamentary government does not mean government by
Parliament. Once, and once only, in the course of English history has
the House of Commons attempted to administer the affairs of this
country through executive committees, and the precedent set by the
Long Parliament has not been followed." 53
B. Control or Examination and Comment
The real and important argument lies between those who believe
Parliament does or should control the Executive and those who believe
that the function of Parliament is to examine and comment on the
proposals and actions of the Government. Clearly the distinction is one
of degree; the power to control is greater than the power to comment,
* 51 MINUTES oF EVIDENCE OF SELECT COMMITreE ON PROCEDURE ON

1497 (Mr. H. A. Hill).
52 Id.,
53

1010 (Sir John W.
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but a critical body, if it has any reality, influences the object of the
criticism although not to so great an extent as does a controlling body.
An example makes the distinction clearer: in 1946 before the Select
Committee on Procedure, a Member 54 asked the Lord President of the
Council if he did not think administration might be improved, had a
Parliamentary committee power to examine government action on a
complaint being made, to investigate immediately and to question government officials. Mr. Morrison replied that the result would be to
demoralise the administration, whereupon the Member said, "May I
put this to you: in an ordinary business concern the board of directors
do not proceed on the basis that if they see something going wrong and
do something about it they will thereby demoralise the business? On

the contrary, they would demoralise the shareholders if they did not do
something about it?" The answer was: "That is a perfect illustration
of where the honourable Member is going wrong. He is converting
Parliament into a board of directors. It is not. At the most Parliament
is the shareholders' meeting and a very effective one." 55 The distinction between the power to control and the power to comment adversely
or favourably is not merely one of words. This is clearly evidenced by
the nature of Sir Gilbert Campion's proposals. Thus for the control of
expenditure, he suggested that the Public Accounts Committee and
the Estimates Committee should be joined to form one "Public Expenditure Committee" with six investigating sub-committees, one of
which would be reserved for special short-term inquiries into current
complaints. The powers of the Committee would be similar to those
of the National Expenditure Committee during the war years and it
would deal with items over the three-year period covered by estimates,
expenditure and accounting. 6 Its powers would clearly be greater than
those of the Estimates Committee and Public Accounts Committee
combined.5 7 On the question of Statutory Instruments, Sir Gilbert
proposed that the Select Committee on Statutory Rules and Orders
should have power to report on the merits of the Instrument, as an
exercise of the powers delegated."' Both these proposals demonstrate
the essential difference between the power to control and the power to
criticise. It arises over the question of policy. The policy behind cerMr. W. J. Brown.' "
55H.C. 189-1 (1946)
3395-7.
56 For an account of these committees see pp. 1100-1104, infra.
57 Id.Appendix to Report 22 and 2229-30, 2234-8.
58 Id. at 30.
54
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tain expenditure or behind the exercise of the power to issue a particular Statutory Instrument has been discussed, criticised and approved
by Parliament either during the debate in the Committee of Supply
or during the passage of the enabling act. Parliament has the duty of
checking that the proposed expenditure is not extravagant and that the
money has been used for the purposes for which it has been voted; it
also has the duty of ensuring that there has been no blatant wastage of
public money; similarly Parliament has the duty of ensuring that the
exercise of the power to legislate has been in accordance with the
parent act. These duties, and more, are carried out by the Select Committees appointed for those purposes; whether these Select Committees
are organised in the best possible way for fulfilling their functions is
not at issue at the moment. "The purpose of their investigations is to
enable Parliament to criticise Executive action and their powers are an
undoubted deterrent. But it is no part of their function directly to
control Executive action, to insist or even to suggest (except that the
Comptroller and Auditor General sometimes makes suggestions to
Departments) that another course of action be taken. In a word, they
are not administrative bodies nor do they suggest alternative lines of
administration. They criticise action but do not attempt directly to
control action.
The three fields in which the House of Commons operates, according to Sir Gilbert Campion's analysis, are the formulation and control
of policy (and the control of administration), the control of finance,
and legislation."9 The nature of these operations must be shortly examined.
1. The Formulationand Control of Policy and the Control of
Administration
The function of the House of Commons to formulate and control
policy is exercised, in this view, during five different forms of proceedings. These are the Address in reply to the King's Speech, the Supply
debates, Adjournment Motions, Substantive Motions and Question
time. The average number of days spent in each session from 1906 to
1937/8, excluding the war years, on these five occasions taken together
was 58.5. No great changes in the time spent during this period appear; thus the Supply debates for the 1906-13 period averaged 30.5
59H.C. 189-1 (1946). Appendix to Report
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days and for the 1929-38 period 31.2 days. Adjournment motions increased from 3.4 days to 7.7 days for the same periods. The totals show
an increase from 56.9 to 61.1. Question time is not, of course, included
in these figures. The average number of days per session is 145.4 so
that the amount of time allotted to "control and formulation of policy"
is 40% of the whole. ° To say that the House of Commons formulates
and controls policy and controls administration when debating and
questioning on these occasions seems inaccurate. The principles of
policy are conceived and formulated by the organs of the political party.
These principles are applied and the details of policy determined by
the Cabinet as the concrete problems arise. The House of Commons
considers Government policy, criticises and approves; but at no time
does it formulate policy. The idea is so contrary to Parliamentary
practice, so unworkable in fact and so incompatible with the duties of
His Majesty's Opposition that one suspects the word "formulation" is
being used in some particular undefined meaning. Nor does the House
"control" policy; here there may be a real danger that the word is being
used in a sense slightly other than is usual. The House does clearly act
in relation to policy in three ways: it approves, it rejects and it influences. The power of the House to reject Government policy can
scarcely be called a controlling power; to control means at least, to
restrain and at most, to govern; it is a positive not a negative action; to
control policy means to direct a policy towards a certain end, not merely
to reject it. If the House controlled policy then the effect of rejecting
the Government's policy should be to substitute another, that of the
majority. But when the House defeats the Government on a matter of
policy, it is dissolved and a new House reassembles after the General
Election. The new House will then consider the new Government's
proposals and will approve them. We are concerned here with the
nature of the relationship between Parliament and an established Government, and are contending that in such a case Parliament does not in
any sense directly control the policy of the Government. We are not
concerned with the undoubted power of Parliament to cause a Government to resign by rejecting its proposed policy. A master has power
not only to dismiss his servant but also to order him to do certain work
in a certain manner. Parliament has the former but not the latter
power. Occasionally, as a result of what is said by various Members in
the House, the Government modifies its policy; this is closer to control
90 Id. at 13.
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by the House. Policy being determined by the party and the Cabinet,
differences within the party are normally settled outside the House and
a Government will very seldom debate a policy which it knows is likely
to be opposed by a large number of its own supporters. The course of
debates does however sometimes cause the Government to change its
policy but, if so, it is because a major clea vage in its own party becomes
clear for the first time during the debate, or because the Government
considers that the opposition in Parliament really reflects a very strong
opposition in the country and that many votes will be lost if the policy
is persisted in. In 1946, opposition in the House and in the country
to the introduction of bread rationing was strong but the Government
believed that the course was unavoidable and would be justified; it
therefore insisted, no doubt hoping that any support it might lose in
the country by the action would be regained when the justification
became evident. The Hoare-Laval agreement on Abyssinia is a notorious example of the electorate expresssing themselves clearly through
the Press and through Members and of the Government yielding to the
pressure; but such occasions are very rare. It remains true that this
influence on the Government in the House is in the great majority of
cases insufficient to move the Government which on every major issue
expects a certain small number of its supporters to disapprove. The
power of the Government Whips over wavering Members is a far
greater influence than the speeches of a few individuals. The idea that
the House of Commons controls policy is based on the fiction that
Parliament controls the Executive and that every Member considers
each proposal on its merits, votes according to his own evaluation, and
is free from any discipline of party.
The only sense in which the House of Commons controls the administration of the country is that by questions, direct representations
by Members to Ministers and motions on the adjournment, it checks
injustices and reveals particular anomalies or short-comings in the
application of government policy. But any general control is absent.
Mr. Lloyd George, giving evidence before a Select Committee in 1931
pointed out that the House has no real effective and continuous control
over the actions of the Executive; that certain subjects such as unemployment, the Estimates and so on are debated in a general way from
time to time but that the House has no machinery for examining these
questions in close detail; that there is n6thing comparable to the finance,
surveyors', police and health committees of local government. He suggested that similar committees should be set up in Parliament with
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power to obtain all the information available to the Ministers and with
authority to examine Ministers and civil servants; such a procedure
would; as he admitted, involve the examination of questions of policy.61
Mr. Churchill was of a similar opinion; of the Unemployment debates
he said, "Every debate has been detached from every other, has been
discursive and disconnected and has just come to a useless futile conclusion," whereas if the matter was debated properly "descending from
the general to the particular and taking the conclusions and opinions
at each stage and the agreements at each stage," the opinion of the
country would be properly guided.62 The difficulty about such proposals is fundamental and recurring. They tend to place the function
of government and administration in the hands of a body too large and
too diverse in opinion to exercise it effectively. The function of the
House of Commons cannot be to govern or administer; having examined and approved policy, it must not, if government is to be efficient,
impede the Executive in the carrying out of that policy. The right to
criticise policy and administration must not be confused with the right
to direct or control the way in which the policy is translated into action.
Nor does the House now exercise this latter function. Mr. Lloyd
George was very definite: "It has not got control. I am speaking now
after 40 years of experience: Parliament has really no control over the
Executive; it is a pure fiction."63 Of the House of Commons, Lord
Eustace Percy has said, "I think its control over executive action is got
by retaining or throwing out the government. I do not think there is
any good in suggesting that the House of Commons has control of
64
executive action of a government which it wants to keep in power.
2. The Control of Finance
The divergence between the theory and practice of Commons control over finance is notorious. The control of taxation is limited to the
debates on the Budget resolutions and the Finance Bill. The average
number of days taken is 15, about 10% of the session.65 Basic changes
are very rarely made as a result of the debates and since the effect of
the resolutions is felt so directly by the electorate itself, it is to the reac61 H.C. 161 (1931)

1356-62, 403, 431-4.

Id. at 111520-6.
Id. at 450.
64 Id. at 2040.
62
63

65 H.C. 189-1 (1946).
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tions of that body rather than to the reactions of Parliament that the
Government pays particular attention. At the same time, the secrecy
which necessarily surrounds the Budget proposals makes consultation
with those to be affected impossible and the representatives of those
interests after Budget day may persuade the Government to modify
the proposals. So, in December 1947, the advertising tax was replaced
by other arrangements. Since the change in the nature of the Committee of Supply, there is no proceeding in the House for the examination of expenditure by the Government; the way in which public
money is being spent is often discussed when policy or administration
is under review but the House itself is too large a body to deal effectively with the strictly financial aspects of government spending. Two
Select Committees-Public Accounts and Estimates-cover much of the
ground. Working under the first, the Comptroller and Auditor General and his staff are continuously auditing the accounts of Government Departments to ensure regularity and accuracy and to check improper and wasteful expenditure. Although the action of the Public
Accounts Committee is inevitably delayed-in 1946 it is examining
the 1944/5 expenditure-it is "a real factor in putting the fear of
Parliament into Whitehall." ' The Estimates Committee is appointed
"to examine such of the Estimates... as may seem fit... and to report
what, if any, economies consistent with the policy implied in those
Estimates may be effected therein." Opinions differ considerably
whether the Committee functions satisfactorily. Sir Malcolm Ramsay,
67
Comptroller and Auditor General in 1931, thought it had little value.
The main grounds of criticism are, first, that expenditure is determined
primarily by policy which the Committee may not examine; second,
that the Committee has insufficient time in which to do its work; and
third, that it has no expert staff but only a Treasury official. The 1931
Select Committee on Procedure recommended that the Committee be
enlarged and provided with an adequate technical staff." Sir John
Wardlaw-Milne who was Chairman of the Select Committee on National Expenditure (the successor to the Estimates Committee during
the 1939-45 period when there were no Estimates) ascribed the failure
of the Estimates Committee to their reluctance to work through sub66 Id. at 3227 (Mr. H. Morrison).

67H.C. 161 (1931) 363-8(16).
68 H.C. 129 (1932) 10.
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Committees. 9 On the other hand, the Government in 1946 considered the Committee able to meet the modem requirements of Parliament effectively, although the implication is that sub-Committees should
be used." In Mr. L. S. Amery's opinion the Committee does as much
1
as can be done in this matter by the House of Commons.7
Under the present system, the main purpose of the Public Accounts
Committee is to see that the money has been spent as laid down by
Parliament and that of the Estimates Committee to ascertain whether
the proposed expenditure is economical. Sir Gilbert Campion suggested
the amalgamation of these two committees into one Public Expenditure
* Committee .with six investigating sub-Committees; four of these would
examine the Accounts and Estimates of groups of Departments while
one would be reserved for major inquiries and one for special shortterm inquiries into current complaints. 2 The Select Committee on
Procedure of 1946 accepted this principle of one Committee 3 but
the Government rejected it."' Sir Gilbert Campion's main argument
was that under the present arrangement, in 1946 the Public Accounts
Committee is considering the 1944/5 expenditure, the Estimates Committee the 1946/7 Estimates, while in between lies the financial year
1945/6 which is nobody's concern. The single committee would work
on a three-year period and be able to check expenditure as it occurred;
by requiring immediate explanations from Ministers and civil servants,
any waste would be detected and stopped at an early stage. The gap
in fact is not so wide as would appear, for the Estimates Committee
inevitably investigates what has previously happened and the Public
Accounts Committee extends its inquiries to what is happening at the
moment. The present Comptroller and Auditor General stated: "When
the Public Accounts Committee considers a report of mine on something that arises out of the past, they almost invariably inquire concerning the present. 7 5 Further, it is normal procedure for a Department immediately after a contract is placed or payment made to
pass the papers to the Exchequer and Audit Department where an
officer makes a selective examination which may be followed by an
69

H.C. 189-1 (1946) %4325(3).

70 Id.at 3180(2).
71 AxmRy, THouGTs oN TE CoNsTrIrUnoN 53 (1947).
72 H.C. 189-1 (1946). Appendix to Report 22.
73 Id.at 43.
74 435 H.C. DEB. 5s., cols. 29-32 (March 17, 1947); 443 H.C. DEB. 5s, cols. 1559-60
(Nov. 4, 1947); H.C. 189-1 (1946) 3180(2)(3).
75H.C. 189-1 (1946)
4120 (Sir Gilbert Upcott).
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investigation.76 This overlapping of the two committees is used as an
alternative argument for the setting up of one committee. The claim
that the House of Commons has a right and a duty to investigate
current expenditure, to cross-examine Ministers and ,officials on the
spending or proposed spending of particular sums of money in particular ways raises once again the fundamental question of the
functions of the House and its relation to the Government. Sir Gilbert
Upcott was decided in his opinion. "If a Parliamentary Committee
were attempting to examine current expenditure in any very literal
sense it would be attempting itself to administer which would be in
fact quite impossible. ' 77 A member of the 1946 Select Committee on
Procedure suggested to him that it would be of very great advantage
to the control of public expenditure if some machinery could be devised
to draw the attention of a Parliamentary Committee to particular expenditure immediately it occurred. He replied: "I feel very dubious
whether that would be so. I feel it is much more effective that Departments should be given a clear opportunity to give their explanations.
I feel the procedure you are suggesting would impose upon a Parliamentary Committee something very near to the duty of administering
the matter itself. ' 78 For the Government, the Lord President of the
Council said, "I would not admit that the House itself should share
in the current executive administration. The business of the House
is to act as a check and a watchdog on the current executive functions.
... It is the business of the Government to spend the money. 79 In its
memorandum the Government objected to Sir Gilbert Campion's
proposal in these terms: "A system which subjected every item of
departmental expenditure over a 3 year period to the close and searching scrutiny of a small body of Members would place a very heavy
burden on senior officers and inevitably hamper the efficiency of
executive action by imposing delays and cramping initiative."8 0
If the House of Commons has a right, as it undoubtedly has, to
require the Government to explain its proposals and account for its
actions, the Government also has a right to demand that it be not
hampered in the actual administration. If the view prevails that the
function of the House of Commons is to control the Executive, then
76 Id. at 187(1).
77 Id. at 4191.

78 Id. at 4228.
791d. at 3226 (Mr. H. Morrison).
so id. at 3180(3)(C).
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the House should constantly examine every governmental action and
continuously be asking the Government, "Why have you spent this
money, which we have admittedly voted to you for that general purpose,
in this particular way?" This is equivalent to government by Parliament through the agency of the Cabinet. What happens in fact is
that the Government explains and defends its policy, acts on that
policy and is questioned, criticised and defended on its actions. This
is the only way in which government can be effective and these are
the functions the House of Commons is fitted to exercise. As Sir
Malcolm Ramsay said in 1931, "If expenditure... is to be reviewed
in detail by a committee or committees of the House a revolutionary
change must be made in procedure and indeed in the constitution."'
3. Legislation
The last function of the House of Commons to be considered is
that of legislation. Apart from the right of Private Members to introduce
bills (which is discused below), the principal right and duty of the
House is to examine, criticise and approve with or without amendments
the legislative proposals of the Government. The rejection of a Government bill, of course, like the defeat of the Government on a policy
motion or the refusal in the last resort to grant Supply,"' entails the
conclusion of the Parliament then sitting and a General Election. The
functions of the House of Commons in relation to the legislative proposals of the Government do not differ in kind from its functions in.
relation to the policy proposed by the Government. But the examination
of legislative proposals is more detailed. In so far as a Government
bill expresses in concrete form 'a part of Government policy, this is
natural and proper although it may be noted that a statement of
Government policy on, for example, foreign affairs may have as farreaching effects as any bill. The average number of days spent in each
session on Public Bills during the period 1906-13 was 72.6; during
the period 1919-29, it was 59.7 and during the period 1929-38 it
was 73.9. These figures represent, roughly, 50%, 45% and 46% of
the total session.83
The Government is always short of time, and reforms in the procedure of the House are frequently initiated by the Government of
8

1H.C. 161 (1931) 363-8 (22).
As did the Upper House of the Parliament of Victoria in October 1947.
83 H.C. 189-1 (1946). Appendix to Report 13.
82
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the day which, in the words of a Government memorandum of 1946,
"must be constantly mindful of their legislative requirements, and
proceed with the main object of facilitating the passage through Parliament of legislation which the Government regard as necessary for the
well-being of the nation. 8 4 In 1945 a Select Committee was appointed
to report what alteration, if any, in the procedure of the House was
desirable for the more efficient dispatch of Public Business; the Committee was further instructed to report as soon as possible upon any
scheme for the acceleration of proceedings on Public Bills submitted
to them by His Majesty's Government.85 The scheme submitted was
originally drafted by a committee of Ministers of the Coalition Government to meet the special circumstances of the period of transition from
war to peace.8 6 It dealt in the main with the Committee stage of bills
and proposed, first, that substantially all bills should be referred to
standing committees; second, that the number of standing committees
should be increased, their size if necessary being reduced; third, that
the number of hours of these committees should be substantially
proposals8 7
increased. The Select Committee approved these three
8
and Standing Orders have been amended accordingly. 8
Sir Gilbert Campion suggested to the Select Committee in 1946
a scheme for the reorganisation of the committee and report stages of
bills. This was, briefly, to appoint two large standing committees of
75 to 100 members. The committee stage would be delegated to subcommittees of 25 members each, to whom 15 would be added in
respect of each bill. Each sub-committee would report its bill not to
the House but to its parent committee which would consider the bill
as the House does at the Report stage. The standing committee would.
then report it to the House which could recommit but not amend. The
two standing committees might be designated "The Central Government Standing Committee" to deal with bills relating to defence,
national finance, law and justice, et cetera, and "The Trade and.
Social Services Standing Committee" to deal with bills falling under
the heads suggested by its name."° The Select Committee rejected this
scheme, the principal ground being that it interfered drastically with
at 3180(1).
85 H.C.9-1 (1945) Terms of Reference.
86H.C.9-1 (1945). Appendix to Report 13, 4.
8
7H.C. 9-1 (1945) 16-15.
88 443 H.C. DEB. 5s, cols. 1765-72.
89 H.C. 189-1 (1946). Appendix to Report 26.
84Id.
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the rights of private Members to move amendments to the bill at the
report stage." The Government agreed with the rejection.'
Two other well-known proposals for Parliamentary reform must
be mentioned here. The first is that Members of the House should
be allocated to committees which would deal with the work carried
out by a Department or group of Departments. Such a scheme was
proposed to a Select Committee in 1931 on behalf of the Independent
Labour Party. The committees would consider all matters appropriate
to its Department, including Supply Votes and the committee stages
of all bills falling within the province of the Department. It would
have the right to question civil servants as well as the Minister.2 If the
purposes of such committees are limited to the acquiring of information
or perhaps to the examination of relevant bills on the committee stage,
it would seem there is much to be said in their favour. But when their
purposes are extended to cover examination and questioning of Ministers and Civil Servants on the current departmental work, the committees begin to control policy; to do this they require to be able to initiate expenditure and, "if they are given control of policy and the
initiative in expenditure, they cannot fail more or less to duplicate the
functions of ministerial departments, and thus produce an undesirable
division of government responsibility.""3 The second is that proposed
by Mr. Winston Churchill before the same committee that an Economic sub-Parliament should be set up of 120 members; 40 would be
Members of Parliament experienced in economic matters and 80 would
be businessmen, trade union representatives or authorities on economic matters. All bills relating to trade or industry would normally
go to this sub-Parliament after the second reading and other bills or
clauses could be referred to it by resolution of either House. The subParliament itself could initiate inquiries or discussions and report to
Parliament. 4 Both these proposals are designed to keep Parliament
closely in touch with the actions of the Government and at the same
time to delegate some of the functions of the House itself to subordinate
bodies so relieving the House of part of its great volume of work.
9o H.C. 189-1 (1946)

11 and 3124-55.

91443 N.C. DEB. 5s, col. 1551 (Nov. 4, 1947).

92 H.C. 161 (1931) 153-5; similarly, evidence (appendix No. 6) of Sir Horace Dawkins,
then Clerk of the House. Also JraqNmrs, PAREI
ErMY RExoR, cc. IV, IX (1934).
9
3 CAMzpoN, INTRoDUaMoN TO THE PRocEDuRE op TnE HoUSE o CommoNs, 2d ed.
51(1947).
H.C.161 (1931) 351 ff.
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In two ways the function of the House with regard to the legislative proposals of the Government differs, in part, from its function in
regard to other proposals. First, it has been noted that the Government
sometimes is influenced by the speeches of Members during debate and
changes its policy in some detail accordingly. Here the influence results
indirectly in the alteration of the proposal. Where amendments are
made to a bill altering the effect of a particular clause and this amendment is accepted by the Government although not originally sponsored
by it, the influence of the House on the proposal is clearly more direct.
As with policy, if the criticismn of part of the bill in the House is severe
and appears to be representative of the feeling in the country generally
and not merely of the Opposition, the bill may be considerably modified
and even withdrawn. The Incitement to Disaffection Bill 1934 and
the Population (Statistics) Bill 1937 are examples. 5 The Government,
in order to speed up the passage of a bill, often makes concessions especially in the committee stage. Often Members with particular knowledge are able to make constructive suggestions which the Government
is wise to adopt. Second, the right of Private Members to introduce
their own bills is an anomaly in the relationship between Parliament
and the Government. It is an anomaly which many desire to preserve
both because of its value and because of its constitutional significance.
Here despite the fact that Government approval, or at least tolerance,
is necessary if the bill is to be passed into law, there is an example of
the initiative in the relationship lying with Parliament. The difficulties which face a Member who wishes to introduce and pass a bill
through Parliament are well known. In addition, the need for the
King's recommendation for a financial resolution means in effect that
Private Members cannot introduce bills which authorise expenditure.
Of 159 bills which Private Members managed to introduce during the
four sessions between 1931 and 1935, 56 were passed. In 1935/6 and
1936/7, 106 were introduced and only 25 passed. The average number
passed per session for the period 1931-37 was 10."6 It seems possible
that this figure will never be exceeded in the future. Moreover, Private Members' time in general reduces the number of opportunities
open to the official Opposition. The division of all available time between the Government and the Opposition would of course eliminate
the right of the small parties to be heard and on that account is unde95

JmrEos, PARIaMErArrARY Plhioaa 230 (1934).

96Id. at 233.
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sirable, but too much emphasis can be laid on a right of Private Members which reduces the time available both to the Government and to
the Opposition. "On the whole," said the Lord President of the Council in 1946 before a Select Committee, "I think legislation, in the main,
had better be on the initiation of the Government, In fact it nearly
'9 7
always has been-that is to say the legislation that has succeeded.
The development of party discipline has inevitably resulted in the status
of individual Members being reduced.
Criticism of the bill is in effect controlled in its amount by the use
of the closure, the Kangaroo and the guillotine. The first may, of
course, be used on all kinds of motions: if moved by a Government
Whip and accepted by the Speaker or Chairman, discussion on the
question is ended. It is not uncommon for the Speaker or Chairman
to refuse to accept the motion in order to protect the rights of the
minority. He is often consulted before the Government proposes to
put the motion and often indicates at this stage that he will not accept
it if it is put.9" Under the Kangaroo power, the Speaker on the report
stage, the Chairman of Ways and Means in Committee of the whole
House, and the chairman of a standing c6mmittee have power to select
the new clauses or amendments to be proposed. Since this power is
provided for by Standing Orders99 and does not require a motion, it
cannot accurately be called a Governmental power; its effect however
is to speed the passage of bills. Guillotine resolutions are moved by
the Government, although agreed timetables for proceedings on a bill
are often the result of consultation with the Opposition. In 1945, the
Speaker*giving evidence before the Select Committee on Procedure
agreed that the effect of all timetables was to put the minority more
and nriore in the hands of the chairman but he continued, "At the same
time, if you have no sort of timetable, you get the Opposition talking,
and nobody else talks in order to get the matter through, while, if you
have a guillotine, the Opposition may have an amendment and they
can discuss it and it may be answered from the other side, and the
debate is more instructive in consequence. I think there is that to ' be
00
said for a guillotine procedure; it gives a reasonable amount of time.'
However, guillotines are not popular and their use is condemned by
the Opposition of the day, which, being concerned to criticise and
97H.C. 189-1 (1946)

98 H.C. 161 (1931)
99 Nos. 28,47(5).
109 H.C. 9-1 (1945)

3609.
997.
23.
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delay most of the Government's legislative proposals, is quick to argue
that guillotines prevent full discussion and so are contrary to the spirit
of the Constitution. In 1945 the Government submitted to the Select
Committee on Procedure a plan to make the regular use of the guillotine more acceptable to the House and, in particular, to the Opposition.
The details of this plan were that a special guillotine resolution, to be
approved by the House, would specify the time to be allowed for each
of the stages of a bill and that a new Emergency Business Committee
would sub-divide the stages. 1 1 The Select Committee rejected this
proposal and suggested instead that, where the Government wished to
prescribe a timetable for a standing committee, the guillotine motion
should name the date by which the bill was to be reported and that the
detailed allocations of sittings should be the work of a sub-committee
of the standing committee. 0 2 The Government accepted this suggestion
as an improvement on their own proposal so far as that proposal applied
to standing committees; the suggestion was approved by the House and
is in operation under Sessional Orders.' 03 This however did not apply
where the committee stage was taken on the floor of the House nor did
it apply to the report stage of any bill. For these two purposes the
Government asked the Select Committee to reconsider the proposal for
a Business Committee ("Emergency" being dropped) and to enable it
to function both under guillotine resolution and where the length of
time to be devoted to a particular stage had been fixed by voluntary
agreement.'0 4 The Select Committee however declined to reopen the
question.' 5 The Government thereupon moved, successfully, in the
House that the Business Committee be set up for these purposes; it
consists of the Members of the chairmen's panel and five other Members nominated by the Speaker and thus totals 17. Its recommendations
have, of course, to be approved by the House.'0 6 The attitude of the
Government to this Select Committee is, in itself, instructive. The
motion which resulted in the setting up of the Select Committee on
Statutory Rules and Orders was supported previously by back bench
Members, one of whom said, "I hope that the House will urge the
Government to appoint a Standing or Select Committee and that the
LO1 H.C. 9-1 (1945). First Report of the Select Committee on Procedure, Appendix
18, 9, 12.
102 H.C. 9-1 (1945)
16-18.
103 443 H.C. Dn. 5s, col. 1562.
10 4H.C. 189-1 (1946) 3180(19).
105 Id. at 60.

106 443 H.C. DEB. 5s, cols. 1638, 1730-44 (Nov. 4, 1947).
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Government will accede to the request." He was reminded that the
Government does not appoint Committees of the House of Commons."' In fact, government support is essential and the members of
Select Committees are normally nominated on the motion of a Government Whip.0 " On the consideration of a report, motions may be
made expressing the agreement or the disagreement of the House with
the report as a whole or with certain paragraphs, or for agreeing to the
recommendations contained in the report generally or with certain
exceptions; or motions may be made which are founded upon, or enforce, the resolutions of the committee, or are otherwise relevant to the
subject matter of the report or the business of the committee.0 9 In
October 1946 the Select Committee on Procedure presented its Third
Report. In March 1947, the Government's views on this Report were
announced in the House of Commons and were circulated."' Of the
five main recommendations made by the committee, the Government
opposed two, postponed one, and agreed with two with modifications.
The Select Committee had considered and rejected seven suggestions
by the Government who dropped four of these and persisted in the
other three. In November 1947 the Report was considered on the
motion that the House approved the proposals made by the Government in March."' The Speaker was very soon asked whether it was
in order to debate the Report or only the Government proposals; he
replied that as he intended to call an amendment which moved that
the House should approve the Report itself, the opportunity for debating the Report would arise. He agreed that if there had been no such
amendment down, the position might have been difficult."" The
mover of this amendment drew attention to the fact that two of the
Governments proposals had been considered by the Select Committee
(which of course had a government majority), rejected, resubmitted
and unanimously rejected a second time and that despite this the Government sought the approval of the House. He added, "if the Government had that kind of view about the changes in procedure whatever
the Committee said and whatever evidence the Committee heard to
influence it, I do not see that they need have bothered to have the
107 389 H.C. DEB. 5s, col. 1605 (May 26, 1943).
108 MAY, PAmr.xrAiY PncrncE, 14th ed., 577 (1946).
109 Id. at 610.
13o 435 H.C. DEB. 5s, cols. 29-32.
"'l443 H.C. DE. 5s, cols. 1549-1764.
112 Id.

at cols. 1550-1.
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Committee at all because they could have carried on with their own
proposals."' 1 3 It is quite clear that the Government is not limited to
accepting or rejecting the whole or part of a report and is entitled to
graft its own proposals on to the recommendations of the Committee;
indeed the Government may move anything relevant to the subject
matter of the report or the business of the committee. What is shown
by this case is that the Government may, without any embarrassment
or fear of defeat make proposals which have twice been considered and
rejected by a committee on which it has a majority on such a subject
as the procedure and Standing Orders of the House of Commons.
More, the Government can without any apparent difficulty-the majority on this question put at 1:45 a.m. was 87 out of a total vote of
207" 4 -carry a proposal (twice rejected by a Select Committee) the
purpose of which is to simplify the machinery for limiting the opportunities of the House to criticise the legislative proposals of the Government. So great is the power of the Government over the House.
Legislation is in fact, as has already been stated, a function of the
Executive rather than the Legislature, subject to the duty of the latter
to consider, criticise, and defend and its right to approve or reject. It
is a governmental duty to conceive, examine, discuss and draft legislative proposals. The practice of consulting interests likely to be affected by the bill, before its introduction, is now common. It has been
criticised on the ground that Parliament is side-tracked and that it tends
to shift power to non-representative bodies. This criticism does not
appear to be valid for it is largely these interests who in fact press
Members to criticise and who brief them for that task. it is surely
preferable, where possible, for the Government to hear criticisms directly from the interests themselves and not merely through Members
whose knowledge of the subject is lately acquired and sketchy. The
Members will not be deprived of their opportunity to criticise on those
general or particular grounds with which they are familiar. Again, it
is a governmental duty to introduce legislative proposals into Parliament, to explain, defend and amend them during their journey through
Parliament and, finally, to have them approved by Parliament. In the
last issue, the House of Commons must either approve the Government's proposals or, by rejecting them, cause the Government to resign.
This is not to deny that Parliamentary influence may, as seen above,
113
Id. at col. 1571.
114
Id. at col. 1744.
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cause the Government to modify its proposals or even, very exceptionally, to withdraw them. But, generally, the choice before the House
of Commons is to accept the bill or eject the Government. The normal
and important Parliamentary function with regard to legislative proposals is the same as it is with all other forms of governmental activity:
to examine, and then to criticise or defend.
C. Conclusion
Parliament, therefore, has two principal functions. First, to consider, defend and criticise the Government's proposals, both legislative
and other, and to defend and criticise the Government on any part of
its administration. Second, to signify its approval or disapproval of the
Government's proposals or actions by the physical act of dividing.
Thus it is correct to call Parliament a legislative body or to say that
in it resides the legislative "power" if by that is meant that the formal
approval of Parliament is needed before a bill becomes law. Parliament
exercises its legislative power when it assents to a bill by registering a
majority in favour of it. In considering a bill, Parliament is performing
another function and exercising another right.
It may be argued, against this contention, that in fact the two functions, rights or powers are really one: that the act of division is only
the numerical registration of the support or opposition previously expressed in the debate. This is true only if we are content to regard
Parliament (and, in particular, the House of Commons) as a unit. So
far it has been assumed that the constitutional conflict between Parliament and Government is real today. This assumption was possible because it is clear that the majority decision of Parliament is a Parliamentary decision. The minority, however strongly it disassociates itself
politically from the majority decision, does not deny the right of that
majority to record the decision as one taken by Parliament (or a particular House) as a whole. The validity of a majority decision can be
denied only by revolution; it cannot be denied constitutionally and, as
Professor Laski has pointed out, Parliamentary government can be
carried on only by parties who accept the same fundamental premises
concerning the desirable bases of society.:" 5 We have therefore been
able to speak of Parliament criticising and defending a proposal (when
we are clearly considering one group criticising and another defending)
115 LASm, PNi
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and at the same time to speak of Parliament approving or rejecting a
proposal (when we know that in fact only a majority of that body does
so).
The question must now however be met whether this consideration of Parliament as a unit on the one hand and the Government on
the other, does not today represent a false antithesis which impedes our
understanding of the present nature of responsible government.
The conflict between Parliament and the Executive culminated in
the revolution of 1688. This was followed, first, by the emergence of
Cabinet Government and by the idea that the leaders of the Government should be not only responsible to Parliament but Members of
Parliament; and second, by the growth of party and of party discipline
with, generally, a recognisable distinction between the policies of the
principal parties. Shortly, the effect of these two developments is that
the Government today not only must but can command a majority in
the House of Commons. The present relationship of Government and
Parliament cannot be compared with the relationship that existed at
any time when the real Executive power was neither in Parliament nor
consistently dependent on a majority there. Whenever, as is usual, the
Government has a majority in the House, it is illogical to speak of a
conflict between the House and the Government; the majority of the
House inevitably agrees with governmental policy; if it did not, there
would be a different Government. Moreover, it is essential to the efficient governing of the country that the Government should command
a clear majority over a combination of the other parties. Minority
Governments, being weak, and having to compromise their actions and
proposals, make poor administrators. As we have already said,"' consent of the minority to be governed, not compromise, is the essence of
the constitution. Mr. L. S. Amery has written: "The two-party system
is the natural concomitant of a political tradition in which government,
as such, is the first consideration. .

.

. It is, indeed, only under the

conditions created by such a tradition that there can be any stability
in a government dependent from day to day on the support of a majority in Parliament."' " 7 And again: "The rise of dictatorships and of oneparty governments has been the almost inevitable consequence of the
ineffectiveness of constitutions which reproduced the outward form of
the British Constitution without that spirit of strong and stable govern116 Supra, pp. 1088-1089.

1

IVAiEmuy, THOUGHTS ON nam CoNsTITUmoN 17 (1947).
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ment which is of its essence.""' Minority Governments are constitutionally and politically undesirable because instead of the Executive
governing through Parliament, Parliament tries and fails to govern
through the Executive. While admitting, therefore, that the power of
-Parliament is greatly increased.during the period of a minority Government, we confine our consideration to the relationship that exists between the Government, the Government's supporters in Parliament
and the Opposition when the Government whether of one party or
of a coalition has an absolute majority in the House of Commons.
'Bargaining between Parliament as a unit and the Government is no
more. So far as it exists, bargaining is carried on by the Government
on the one hand with its own supporters to ensure that the unity of the
party is maintained, and on the other hand with the Opposition mainly
with the object of saving Parliamentary time. The claim that grievances
should precede supply is now only echoed to explain historically a
particular part of House of Commons procedure. There are a few
occasions when it appears that the House of Commons (or the House
of Lords) is acting as a unit. One such occasion is when the House
is unanimous, as it might be on a message of congratulation or on a
declaration of war; here the appearance is deceptive for two bodies
do not become merged in one because they happen to agree. Another
occasion is when a House is considering its own procedure, is acting
internally, not externally; but here again, it is stretching the meaning
of words to regard as one two bodies who are disagreeing about the
methods they shall adopt for expressing their disagreement. Parliament
is a place of meeting with an atmosphere of its own; but it is no
longer a single body urgent in its claims, speaking with one voice,
opposing the King.
It therefore seems more accurate to state the conflict as between
His Majesty's Government (including its supporters in Parliament)
and His Majesty's Opposition, and to deny that there is in fact any
real issue today between Government and Parliament. The function
of Parliament is to examine governmental proposals, and then to criticise and defend them. The power to criticise is usually more stressed
but it must not be forgotten that there is inevitably more support of the
Government by Members than there is opposition. Parliament is not
merely a forum for criticism and the exposure of governmental shortcomings; it is also the forum for defence, approval and congratulation
118 Id. at

18.
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of the Government. To say that the duty of Parliament is to criticise
is only half of the truth, as when Sir Ivor Jennings writes indiscriminately on the same page: "The function of Parliament is not to govern
but to criticise.... The Government governs and the Opposition
'
criticises.""'
The function of criticising the Government in Parliament
has largely passed to the Opposition. But the fact that it has -not
wholly passed, that the Government is frequently criticised in Parliament by its own supporters shows that Members are not only supporters
or opponents of the Government but also representatives and yet individuals expected to exercise their own judgment. As representatives,
Members of all parties criticise the Government on matters of
administration which affect their constituencies. Further, in almost
every debate, a small number of Government supporters find themselves
obliged to oppose, generally on the ground that the proposed action
is half-hearted but occasionally on the ground that it is too drastic.
Nevertheless it remains true that Members of the majority party
normally support the Government and that no individual can consistently oppose the general policy of the Government- and remain a
member of that party. That Ministers regularly meet their own supporters outside the Chamber to discuss the misgivings of the latter
on questions of policy does not affect this argument. The policy which
a Government decides to follow is not a brain child conceived and born
within the four walls of the Cabinet room; it is the result of many
influences which are brought to bear on the leaders of the Government.
Decisions of party conferences, the opinions of industrialists and trade
union officials, the general economic, political and international situation
are all taken into account. So is the probable opinion of those individual
Members who fill the back benches on the Government side. The Government must be sure that the policy which it is about to propose is one
which will have the support of its own Members. The conflict here is not
one between Parliament and Government; it is between different groups
of the same political party as to what the policy of the party shall be. That
the result of the disagreement may be made public in Parliament only
indicates the nature of.the power of one particular group. Other groups
(whether of the Government's party or not) have other powers which influence the Government. Trade unions may call strikes; industrial leaders
may precipitate economic crises. The power of the parliamentary group
is to threaten a political crisis in Parliament. But this is no more a
conflict between Parliament (or the House of Commons) as a unit
119 JENNGs, CABErT Govlrmmm
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and the Government than is the perennial conflict between the Government and the Opposition. In the face of determined opposition from
its Parliamentary supporters, the Government has only two alternatives:
to modify its policy or to risk defeat in Parliament. If it modifies its
policy then no conflict between Parliament and the Government occurs.
If it persists in its policy in Parliament and is defeated, the question
goes begging, for we are denying not the power of Parliament to eject
the Government but the existence of a persistent conflict between an
established Government with a majority, and Parliament.
We have noted 2 ° that an elector casting his vote consciously
performs two tasks. First, by voting for a party, he indicates that he
wishes to be governed by a particular group of individuals, the leaders
of that party. Second, by voting for an individual he indicates that he
wishes to be represented in the House of Commons by that individual.
It follows that a Member of the House of Commons has two functions
to perform. If he is a Member of the majority party, his duty is to
support the Government of the day in its general policy unless his
conscience forbids, while at the same time remembering his duty to
his constituency-which may involve criticism of the details of administration; such criticism will not normally imply disapproval of policy
but will point out that one of the ways in which that policy is being
implemented needs reconsideration. If he is a Member of the Opposition, his duty is to oppose the Government (again, subject to his
conscience) in its general policy, unless the policy of his party agrees
with that of the Government, and in its administration.
The answer to the question put above, 12 1 therefore, is that, although
the Government is criticised from its own benches as well as those
of the Opposition, the fact that the Government is composed of leaders
of the majority party ensures that there can be no persistent, fundamental or constitutional conflict between the Government and
Parliament; government could not be carried on if there were. The
Government thesis is put by Ministers of the Crown and is supported
by the Members of the Majority party. The antithesis is provided
not by Parliament but by His Majesty's Opposition in Parliament.
III
In conclusion, we may summarise as follows. Parliament does not
govern. Parliament does not control the Government, although events
120 Supra, p. 1091.

121 Supra, p. 1113.
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and criticisms in Parliament influence the Government. Parliament
does not legislate, unless we limit that word to mean the formal assent
to a legislative proposal which Parliament has examined, criticised
and defended.
Parliament is supreme over the Government only in the sense that
it has the ultimate power of dismissal. Ministers are servants of the
Crown, responsible to Parliament. But they are not in any real sense
servants of Parliament which neither appoints nor instructs them. On
the other hand, Ministers being responsible to Parliament must submit
to the-scrutiny of Parliament their proposals and actions. Although a
Government which commands the support of Parliament may be sure
of Parliamentary approval it will continue to administer as responsibly
and efficiently as it can. For by submitting its proposals and actions
to Parliamentary scrutiny, the Government submits them to the scrutiny
of the electorate directly, through the publicising of Parliamentary
proceedings. Further, the effects of Government action are felt by
the electorate who judge broadly whether the Government is performing its duties in their best interest. Not only is the Government to
some extent dependent on the temper of the electorate during the
course of its administration but it is keenly aware that the sands of
its period in office are ever running out and that it will have to face
the electorate again for a renewal of their mandate. The Government's
knowledge that it is, so to speak, only on approval and that within
five years of its appointment it must once more seek the opinion of
the electorate is the greatest assurance that it will endeavor to govern
in the interests of the people.
It follows from what has been said above that there is little significance in the assertion that the supremacy of Parliament over the
Executive is threatened. Parliament and the Executive have different
functions within the constitution and neither is supreme over the
other. The Executive governs; the Opposition in Parliament considers
and generally criticises while the Government supporters consider and
generally approve the proposals and actions of the Executive. A Govrernment which is not supported by a majority of the members of the
House of Commons cannot fulfil its function; but it is of the essence
of the constitution that the Government can command such a majority;
the powers of the Government are therefore great as its duties are
great. At the same time the Government is ever faced by the approaching end of its period in office and by the need for a new vote of
confidence from the electorate. This does not mean, as we have seen,
that the group of individuals who govern the country act without
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regard to the other groups in the community during. their period of
office. To do so would be short-lived folly. The influences on the
Government are many; they vary in power and persuasiveness. Government supporters and Members of the Opposition in Parliament,
leaders of industry, trade unions, the professions, charitable societies
and many more must all be listened to and answered. But finally the
Government makes its decisions and relies on its supporters, especially
those in Parliament. With their assistance, it carries its decisions into
effect; without their assistance, that Government and that Parliament
are finished until the electorate has spoken.
There is also little significance in the assertion that the Government
is usurping the functions of Parliament by legislating. We have seen
that legislation is predominantly a governmental function, but that
Parliament has the function of considering and approving the proposals.
It is true that formerly Parliament was able to consider all the details
of all the Government's legislative proposals; now it is unable to do
so. But the reason for this is not that a jealous and grasping government wishes to restrict the Parliamentary function but that Parliament
neither has the time nor is fitted to consider the whole of every
proposal. On the other Rand, Parliament generally requires that that
part of the proposal which it has not seen be 'laid before it and be
subject to its authority. The fact remains, however, that Ministers
may, under Parliamentary sanction,, prepare and issue measures, of a
specified kind and for a specified purpose, which have the force of
law although Parliament has divided on the general and not the
particular question. To Dr. Allen, this means the loss of a considerable
amount of Parliamentary "supremacy" and "sovereignty." If this is
to be the result, he writes, "it would surely be better that this should
be done openly and by design than by subterfuge and side-wind."' 2
It may be better, but it has never been the way of constitutional change
in this country. The theory of the constitution is the rationalisation
of events; changes in society result in changes in the method of government. The duty of a constitutional theory is to recognise and explain
these changes; the way they come about is a matter of fact. To bewail
the method of the change because its nature is not liked confuses the
issue.
12
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The constitutional significance of delegated legislation is shown
in two ways.
First, delegated legislation reveals the nature of the relationship
between Parliament and the Executive by sharply outlining their contrasting yet complementary functions. Resulting from the increase
in governmental activity, it emphasizes the fact that the initiative in
legislation and administration necessarily rests with the Government
and that Parliament, although its Members will continuously be
influencing the Government, is today so rooted in the party system
that governmental decisions will finally be accepted. That the majority
of the Members of the House of Commons agree with the Governments proposals and actions results inevitably from the way in which
Governments are formed. While there is always the possibility that
a sufficiently large number of the majority may change their minds,
and destroy themselves in destroying their rulers, the ultimate insurance
of good government is the knowledge that periodic abdication is a
statutory and constitutional requirement.
Second, delegated legislation shows the nature of the current
constitutional changes. It shows how Parliament, a large and heterogeneous body, is being forced by the thrust of events to limit its
examination to those basic principles of policy and execution which
are its proper concern. The failure to recognise this results in Parliament examining legislative proposals which often are loaded with
detail and sometimes are denuded of principle. Finally the practice
and statutory requirement of consultation with affected interests outside Parliament underlines the limitations of Parliament and shows
how they may be supplemented. Government in a democracy must be
both efficient and in accordance with the wishes of the majority. It
must therefore be responsible. In 1918, the Haldane Committee
reported: ". . . the preservation of the full tesponsibility of Ministers
for executive action will not, in our opinion, ensure that the course
of administration which they adopt will secure and retain public
confidence, unless it is recognised as an obligation upon Departments
to avail themselves of the advice and assistance of advisory bodies
so constituted as to make available the knowledge and experience of
all sections of the community affected by the activities of the Department.' 2 3 Parliamentary examination by itself does not suffice.
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The dangers inherent in delegated legislation are the same as and
no greater than the dangers inherent in all government. They cannot
be guarded against by adding an extra wing to the Houses of Parliament. The increase in governmental activity demands an improvement
in the technique of self-government.

